| The Spanish Road to Democracy |
The Transition 21st November 1975 was a grey and cold day in Madrid when long queues were formed, on the narrow cobblestone streets, by Spaniards in their anticipation to get a last glimpse of their Dictator for almost 40 years who was lying in State at Palacio de Oriente. A tearful Prime Minister, Arias Navarro, had in the morning of the previous day, announced the death of Francisco Franco Bahamonde who had passed away after a long and painful illness. The feelings among the crowd were mixed. Some may have felt a genuine loss whilst others were relieved to look forward to the prospects of a new era after years of political stagnation and oppression, although the one sentiment they all had in common was the apprehension of the days ahead. The format of the changes to come had been on the political agenda, officially as well as unofficially, for many years preceding General Franco’s death. “Reforma Democratica” and “Ruptura Democratica” were the two avenues envisaged for the post dictatorship Spain. “Reforma” v/s “Ruptura”, each stream backed by opposite political associations and groupings, confronted each other against the dangerous backdrop of memories from the pre Civil War precarious political arena. There were also those who wished to strictly maintain the “status quo” scenario under the severe auspice of parts of the army and General Franco’s family. With an oblique reference to Hitler’s last days in Berlin at the end of World War II, they became known as the “Bunker”. The Dictator’s death acted as a catalytic converter in the immediate wake of the transformation of Spain’s political systems with a multitude of political parties and associations springing up ready to influence the movements towards reforms in all sectors and walks of life. “Reforma Democratica” was the incumbent of the evolution towards democracy within the established equilibrium backed by the concept of a gradual re-engineering process. “Ruptura Democratica”, on the other hand, supported by the communist and socialist opposition groups promoted as the name indicates a more radical approach to Spain after Franco. In the event of reality, the sombre shadow of the “Bunker” was to portray the ghostly image of “El Caudillo”, the populist reference assigned to General Franco, during the tense and turbulent period of the transition. It may be misleading to give the transmission period fixed time boundaries as the process emerged soon after the end of the Civil War with activities both inside and outside Spain which are now embodied in the foundation for democracy. Consequently, I have been flexible in referring to and clarifying events which have their roots in the pre transition period. This refers mainly to social, economical and cultural movements evolving as part of the Spanish people’s stride towards a free and open society. However, politically, the period of transition can be defined from November 1975 , the death of General Franco , to December 1982, when Felipe Gonzales brought PSOE to power after a landslide victory in a general election. At this point in time the transition moved from the stage of implementation to that of consolidation. Francoism In order to appreciate the events which took place during the period of political transmission, one needs an understanding of the political system preceding it. The system which became known under the reference of “Francoism” had its roots far beyond the mind of the dictator himself. In February 1936, the political association “Popular Front”, a coalition of left to centre parties, formed a government under the Prime Minister, Manuel Azana. This government was mainly made up of representatives from the Liberal Bourgeoisie embracing no particular revolutionary tendencies but with a manifestation to improve the general living conditions for the majority of the Spanish people. Until the economic revolution in the 1960’s, which changed the demographical landscape, the Spanish masses were bound to a rural, agricultural oligarchy. The old establishment, the landowners, the church and the army, envisaged, in the emerging political platform, a threat to their long outlived autocratic privileges. Popular Front’s victory resulted in a polarisation of the political scene to the extent of civil disorder making any concessions between the many factions impossible. From March 1936 a coup was contemplated by a number of generals, among them Sanjuro, Mola and Varela. General Franco, having been posted to the Canary Islands as “Comandante General”, was both physically and mentally, not directly in the loop for what was conspired before the outbreak of the Civil War on 18th July 1936 but was fully aware of the proceedings. His rise to power and the subsequent dictatorship under his governance had never been the ingredients of the initial uprising. General Franco was a military man and his competence, both academically and practically, in the fields of economy and political science was at the time of the Civil War restricted to a basic level of knowledge. By all accounts, it was insufficient for him to be able to govern Spain with all its complexities. The gap in skills was, by coincidence, filled by Franco’s brother-in-law, Ramon Serrano Suñez, who arrived at the Nationalist headquarters in Salamanca on 20th February 1937 after a lucky escape from a republican prison in Madrid. Serrano Suñez was an intelligent, well educated man with a debonair approach to life accompanied by a firm belief in Fascist political ideals. His profession as a senior lawyer transformed him into the perfect accomplice to the Dictator. It may be perceived that Serrano Suñez was the principal brain behind “El Movimiento” (The Movement) which became the main political tool in the support of “Francoism”. The party was formed in April 1937 by the consolidation through manipulations and force of the Falange and the Carlist political parties. The full name of the new party was “Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista”. “El Movimiento” was easier to apply and was used as a common reference in everyday language. The party was a doctrinal mixture of fascism, anti-liberalism, dogmatic Catholicism and the Dictator’s personal aversions to communism and Freemasonry. The Falange party which was the creation of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of Miguel Primo de Rivera the dictator during the 1920s, had its siblings in the fascist organisations in Germany and Italy but maintained its individual profile. Its arranged marriage with the deeply catholic Carlists never made a happy union. It was kept together by the army, which throughout the era of Francoism held the key to power. This key was subsequently firmly lodged in the pocket of General Franco. The dictatorship under the umbrella of Francoism was not a “banana republic” which could easily be manoeuvred into an alternative political platform. Beyond the thin, fictitious surface of adulation of Francisco Franco could be found deep roots going back to a class structure non-compatible with the Western democracies which Spain desperately desired to join. There were attempts to put a veneer over the various imperfections in order to make Spain more palatable to the rest of the world. “Ley Organica del Estado” formed a vital part of these attempts and pretended to introduce some social justice into the governance of the dictatorship. On 14th December 1966, “Ley Organica” was put forward to the Spanish people in a referendum which resulted, with the help of some irregularities, in a welcomed but hollow recognition of the regime by 96% of the electorate who voted. The most significant aspect of “Ley Organica” was the separation between the functions of “Head of State” and “Prime Minister”. The latter to be chosen by the Head of State from a list of three candidates proposed by “Consejo del Reino” (the Kingdom’s Counsel) which constituted an important political body within the realms of Francoism. Perceived against this backdrop of deep rooted dogma and political whitewash, the implementation of democracy through the transition process can be deemed as a gigantic achievement. The Succession General Franco’s claims to power, through judicial structures, were somewhat illusive. He had, in September 1936, in a wood cabin by the airport in Salamanca, been chosen by a group of Nationalist Generals for the position of “El Generalisimo” or Head of the Nationalist Military Organisation. He skilfully utilised this post as the “rocket pad” to launch himself into the orbit of the post Civil War Spain as its undisputed leader and dictator. For almost 40 years Franco retained a strict guard of his personal powers through orchestrated efforts directed to both the national and international communities. A combination of shrewdness and luck saw this strategy succeed with its diversion into three different streams.
The only serious challenge to Franco’s hold on power came from Estoril in Portugal in the disguise of Juan Borbon y Battenberg, who was the youngest son of King Alfonso XIII. Don Juan was exiled from Spain at the same time as his father in 1931 and in 1941 was recognised by him as the successor to the throne. For most of his life Don Juan carried a burning ambition of one day becoming King of Spain. He volunteered, in the initial stages of the uprising in 1936, to participate in the fighting on the Nationalist side but was tactfully rebuffed by General Franco. After 1939, he questioned vigorously the Dictator’s legitimacy to power and subsequently formed his own private council in Portugal in pursuit of his ambitions. Don Juan maintained strong sympathies within sections of the armed forces but these were insufficient for him to be able to remove the Dictatorship by force. There were a few impromptu meetings between Don Juan and “El Caudillo” but these encounters resolved little except for one important item. Don Juan’s eldest son, Carlos Borbon y Borbon, was from and early age to be educated in Spain with the intention of gaining an appreciation of his native country which he might one day, in the future, serve in the role of King. King Juan Carlos Paul Preston relates in his book, Juan Carlos, a moving account of a young boy who is thrown from pillar to post, like a dice in a charade, centred round two men’s struggle for power. The prince was born in Rome in 1938 into a family revolving in exile between different locations without a firm focal point. He adored his mother, Maria de las Mercedes Borbon, but was never, as a boy, permitted to absorb her love in case it might weaken his stamina as a future king. Initially, educated in Switzerland, his studies were consequently transferred to Spain where Juan Carlos entered Zaragoza Military Academy at the age of 16. On 18th July 1957, he passed out as a Second-Lieutenant. In September 1960, Juan Carlos started his university studies in El Escorial with specially selected tutors lined up to attend to the Prince’s further education. His professor in history and political science, Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, was a brilliant scholar who was reknown for his expertise in the political systems of Francoism. Master and pupil struck up a special relationship which later would influence the events of the Transition. Fernandez-Miranda’s advice concerning the practical applications of his tuition was: “You will have to do the same as the trapeze artists who work without a safety net”. As the years passed, the Spaniards came to terms with the fact that only the Caudillo’s own mortality would cease his grip of power. The answer to the question “What will happen after Franco?” embedded in the political issue of “Succession”, increased in urgency when Francisco Franco aged rapidly as a consequence of his suffering from Parkinson’s disease. Franco was cagey by nature and on this occasion his legendary elusiveness frustrated even his closest family with his refusal to make a decision. “El Ley de Sucesion “(The Law of Succession) was approved by the Cortes in June 1947 without any consultations with the Nation. The first Article read: “Spain declares herself constituted as a Kingdom”. The second Article declared: “The Head of State is the Caudillo of Spain and of the Crusade, Generalisimo of the Armed Forces, Don Francisco Franco Bahamonde”. In practise, the Law of Succession gave Franco the right to govern Spain for life with the privilege of selecting his own successor. Like a good poker player, the Dictator kept his cards up his sleeves as long as possible. There were a number of contenders to the throne and by playing the “carrot and stick game”, he succeeded in utilizing the surrounding uncertainty to his own advantage. Prince Juan Carlos was, however, his favourite contender, almost to the extent of being considered, by emotion, as the son he never had. On 23rd July 1969 Juan Carlos was confirmed as successor to Francisco Franco, on his death or inability to govern, to be the King of Spain with the terms of reference to continue governing in the spirit of the Movement. Elections 1977 In the wake of General Franco’s death, bottles of Cava, a sparkling white wine, were sold out in Spain and in Cataluña in particular. After a heady night follows a heavy morning, that was the sentiment the Spanish people experienced in January 1976 when looking up towards the dark political clouds of doubtful years ahead. Juan Carlos was declared “Head of State” with the title of King before “Las Cortes” (The Parliament) on 22nd November 1975. His reputation was, at that point in time, far from favourable, being portrayed by an image of a very privileged man with a flair for the “jet-set” life, who had been brought up under the guidance of Francoism. His marriage to Princess Sofia of Greece in Athens on 14th May 1962 had improved his standing but, “was he the person to find solutions to the current obstacles confronting Spain?” His task was formidable and maybe compared to that of making a time bomb safe.
King Juan Carlos’ convictions towards democracy may be attributable to the following factors:
Following the norms of the “reforma” principle, Francoism had to be dismantled through its own institutions. Torcuato Fernandez Miranda, the King’s old tutor, was appointed President of two key institutions “Las Cortes” (the Parliament) and “El Consejo del Reino” (the Kingdom’s Counsel) on 3rd December 1975. Founded on the two men’s relationship of trust, the King now had direct access and influence over the main political engines of Francoism. Fernandez Miranda initiated his work by creating a stepping stone for the existence of parliamentary groupings to be active within “Las Cortes”. To facilitate this task he formalised, in February 1976, a commission with representatives from the Government and “Consejo Nacional del Movimiento” (the Board of the Movement) with the objective of speeding up the Reform programme. His reward came in June 1976 by the Cortes’ approval, for the right to form political associations within the Parliament. This in spite of fierce resistance from the Bunker. In King Juan Carlos’ first government, which was formalised on 13th December 1975, he maintained Arias Navarro, from the days of Franco, as Prime Minister on the condition that he co-operated with the planned reformation of existing political systems. Arias Navarro had his professional roots deeply engraved in the ideology of Francoism and his feeble attempts at modernisation did not even generate a growl from the Bunker. His relationship with the King became frostier by the day until it finally iced up altogether on 1st July 1976, the day of Arias Navarro’s resignation. In line with the tradition of Francoism, a list of three candidates, in Spanish referred to as “La Terna”, was presented to the King by “Consejo del Reino”. “La Terna” included the name of Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, a young dynamic politician with a falange background, on the recommendation of Fernandez Miranda and with the unofficial blessing by the King. On 3rd July 1976, Adolfo Suarez was asked officially, by the King, to form a new government. Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez was 44 years old when he became Prime Minister in 1976. He had previously distinguished himself as Civil Governor in Segovia and as Director of Radio and TV. In the December 1975 cabinet he served as Secretary General of the Movement. In spite of these achievements, Adolfo Suarez was regarded as an outsider and his appointment as Prime Minister was greeted with surprise. He had up to this point in time not demonstrated any inclinations towards democracy. Outside the borders of Spain, Suarez was practically unknown and in Spain he was seen as a politician closely associated with Francoism. The King’s choice, by the virtue of ignoring far more experienced men, was founded on his preference to co-operate with someone without any set preconditions on how to execute the Transition and who he could influence through cooperation. The period from 3rd July 1976 to 15th June 1977 can be considered as the peak of the Transition with the dismantling of the political systems of the past, especially “Las Cortes”, and their replacement by two Chambers, the Congress and the Senate. The process was set in motion by the introduction of the legal document “Ley para la Reforma Politica” (Law of Political Reform). Its content was presented to the nation through radio and television on 11th September 1976 and approved by the Parliament with a large majority in November. It should be observed that the official opposition, previously exiled, did not have a voice in the debate at this moment in time. However, Adolfo Suarez had initiated consultations with Felipe Gonzalez, the leader of the largest opposition party PSOE. PCE, the Spanish Communist Party, was at this stage not included in the circuitry of the exchange of opinions. The “Law for Political Reform” was confirmed by a referendum on 15th December 1976 which opened the door for the creation of political parties, including the assurance of general elections in the near future. There was from now on a proliferation of political groups from the extreme left to the extreme right in anticipation of forthcoming elections. This situation was a new ballgame bestowing upon the politicians a steep learning curve in parliamentary democracy. Even Adolfo Suarez had to adapt to the new complex scenario in order to remain a player on the political stage. He managed, in the spring of 1977, to create a coalition between various liberal, social and democratic parties which was presented to the nation as “Union de Centro Democratico” (The Democratic Centre Union) UCD. UCD did not inherit a natural ideological composition from its various components but was a union of convenience rather than convictions. On the right centre wing of the political spectrum emerged “Alianza Popular” (Popular Alliance) led by Manuel Fraga Tribarne, who had previously been Franco’s Minister of Information during a period in the 1960’s and instrumental in initiating many of the economic and social reforms rising at that time. For example, he was the driving force behind the introduction of mass tourism in Spain. Today, an octogenarian statesman, Manuel Fraga is a much respected politician and honorary President of “Partido Popular” (Popular Party), currently the largest opposition party. “Partido Socialista Obrero Español” (The Spanish Socialist Party) PSOE was founded in 1897 by Pablo Iglesias. The party played an important role in the Republican government in the1930’s but was declared illegal during the years of Francoism. It emerged again in the early 1970’s under the leadership of a young dynamic lawyer from Seville, Felipe Gonzalez Marquez. He managed to play down and finally remove PSOE’s Marxist outlook in pursuit of making the party acceptable to a broad electorate. Through this act, it transformed itself into the principal opposition against UCD in the forthcoming elections. General elections were declared in April 1977, to take place on 15th June of the same year, the first for 40 years, under the terms of the law for political reform “Ley para la Reforma Politica”. In the same month, the Communist Party “Partido Communista Español”, PCE, was legalised and permitted to participate in the elections. With the aim of portraying the ideals of the democratic process, the party aligned itself to the trend of Euro communism which had emerged with its proper identity profile in contrast to the Cold War communism of the Soviet Union. The general elections passed smoothly with an aura of jubilancy attached to the proceedings, giving trend setting results for the future. “Union de Centro Democratico”, UCD, gained 47.1% of the total electorate with 6.3 million votes. PSOE in second placed obtained 5.2 million votes with 33.7% of the electorate. We can, with this composite, recognise the contemporary parliamentary situation with two major blocks, centred round middle of the road policies with minor left/right swings, dominating the political landscape. Manuel Fraga’s “Alianza Popular” party only succeeded in attracting 4.6% of the electorate and the Communist party under its leaders, Santiago Carrillo and Dolores Ibarruri, “La Pasionaria”, failed to reach 6%. These two grand rebels from the days of the Second Republic were now viewed with nostalgia rather than as serious contenders in the battle for votes. The extreme right and left wing parties were virtually eliminated with, for example, the Falange diminished by only acquiring 0.2% of the electorate. Consequential to the intent and purpose of the general elections King Juan Carlos now transferred his day to day powers to the elected government. In opening the Cortes on 22nd July 1977 a relieved Juan Carlos made the following statement: “Democracy has begun. Now we must try to consolidate it”. The Moncloa Pact How could General Franco, hampered by poor health and fatigue, still remain dominant in Spain during the autumn years of his life? Behind the appearance of a confused old man could be found an efficient organisation of bureaucrats, making sure that the francoist machinery was running in spite of substantial cracks appearing in its façade during the early 1970s. But only 1 1/2 years after the Dictator’s death, Francoism passed away with its founder. It is intriguing to reflect that the champions of the transition were the very same men who once shovelled coal into the francoist engine. The previous exiled opposition was only gradually brought into the Transition process even if pre-election consultations had taken place. After the June 1977 elections the Transition required a broader decision base in order to solve the severe economical and social difficulties facing Spain at the time. The level of inflation was +20% and unemployment had become exceptionally high. Adolfo Suares gathered in October 1977 representatives from all walks of the political life together at the official residence of the Prime Minister, the Moncloa Palace in Madrid, for consultations in order to create a platform for the ongoing reforms. These encounters of consensus became known as “The Moncloa Pact” and formed an important part in the continuous rollout of the Transition. The idea was to reach a convergence of opinions from the widest possible spectrum of the community as a stepping stone on the climb towards a new Constitution. The results included many legislative changes for example to the police force, the courts, freedom of expression, women’s rights and divorce. Economically the inflation was cut back to 16.5% in 1978 which generally regarded as a moderate success. The Moncloa negotiations cemented many aspects of the cooperation which was imperative for the success of the Spanish road to democracy. The Constitution of 1978 Over the last 200 years Spain has had many different set of constitutions with the first one presented in Cadiz in 1812 during the end of the Peninsular War. The 1812 Constitution was for its time a masterpiece in liberalism. However it was totally suppressed by King Ferdinand VII who laid the foundation to the autocratic governance in Spain during the 19th century. Many aspects of this regime influenced the tactics of francoism with its “Leyes Fundamentales” (Fundamental laws) which constituted the steel frames in a straight jacket society. “Spain is a democratic state in search of freedom, justice, and equality for all who lives there”. These are the preamble words of the Constitution of 1978. The configuration of its contents started just after the 1977 elections and took the speed of a bushfire to pass through the various legal institutions. A 36-man all-party commission was put into action to navigate it through the political archipelago. The final text was presented to the Senate and Congress for a vote in October 1978. The Senate vote was 226 for, 5 against and 8 abstentions and in the Congress 335 for, 6 against with 14 abstentions. The Constitution was put to the country in a referendum on 6th December 1978. The turnout was 68% with 87% of the votes cast in favour and only 8% against. The parliamentary architecture was confirmed in the Constitution. The delegates to both the Senate and the Congress are elected for a period of 4 years. The number of delegates in the Congress, between 300 – 400, is based on a proportional representation for each province. On the contrary the Senate depends on a fixed number of representatives for each province. With the words “For all who lives there” the Constitution’s aim is to cover a broad national and social base with an inclination towards a degree of generalisation. This aspect hits the rock when it comes to regional policies, which is an issue highlighted daily up to these days in the Spanish press. The two major autonomous regions, Catalonia and the Basque Country with their own specific languages and customs, have in the Constitution been treated with maximum flexibility without breaking the unity of Spain. However the extent of this flexibility is an ongoing drama with an uncertain outcome. Changes in the Society The changes in the society from the “straight jacket” model to a more casual outfit were gradual in the course of the transition period. The Constitution formalised what had become common practice for some time. Let us look at a few examples:
Elections 1979 King Juan Carlos was impelled to conduct two incompatible roles during the later years of the Transition. The first as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the second as a Constitutional Monarch maintaining the momentum of the ongoing reforms. This double act proved at times to be the challenge of “mission impossible”. The “Bunker” sector of the army grew more hostile as the democratisation process was rolled out with the threat of a subversion becoming increasingly probable. Against this background as well as continuous terrorist attacks by the Basque Nationalist Army, ETA, general elections were held on 1st March 1979 with the aim to enforce the concept of the Constitution. The results from these elections were only marginally different from those in June 1977 and UCD with Adolfo Suares as Prime Minister was entrusted a second term in office. “Union de Centro Democratico” UCD was only kept together with a wafer thin layer of glue and when its leader Adolfo Suares began to isolate himself from his colleagues and withdraw from the substantial concurrent problems confronting the country, the party started to extricate itself. This alteration in personality was probably due to exhaustion after years of pressure from high office. Regional autonomy, terrorism, unemployment and military subversion were all urgent issues requiring attention. A popular reference assigned to the government was “desgobierno” (inability to govern). The Prime Minister sensing the mood of the people resigned from office in a surprise move televised on 29th January 1981. Leopold Calvo Sotelo, coming from a prestigious political family, was elected by UCD to succeed Adolfo Suares as party leader on 8th February. In spite of an impressive heritage Leopold Calvo Sotelo was not the man to fill the vacuum after Adolfo Suares. 23 F “23 F” is the symbolic reference to Monday 23rd February 1981. This is the day when events took place which the Spaniards expected to happen but never really dreamt would materialise. It was the day when the new-born democracy in Spain almost evaporated. Here is a brief narrative of what originated that fatal day. The Parliament was during the late afternoon on 23rd February in a plenary session of the investiture of Calvo Sotelo as Prime Minister. The proceedings were abruptly interrupted at 6:23 p.m. by approximately 320 armed Civil Guards under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero who stormed the building. The entire government and the nation’s parliamentary deputies were taken hostage under considerable stress and humiliation. At 6:45 p.m. the General of the Valencia military region Jaime Milans del Bosch declared a state of emergency in his domain. Tanks entered the streets and a curfew was imposed in the city. In the meantime King Juan Carlos was relaxing playing squash with two friends. He was informed about the military eruption at about 7 o’clock in the evening. From then on frantic negotiations were conducted from “La Zarzuela” (The Royal Palace) with the various generals of the Armed Forces with the objective to secure their loyalty to the King. At 1:15 a.m. on 24th February Juan Carlos addressed the nation via television. His words were: “The crown, symbol of the permanence and unity of the Fatherland, cannot tolerate any actions or attitudes by those who aim to interrupt by force the democratic process determined by the popularly ratified Constitution.” All Generals adhered to the King’s proclamation and by dawn on 24th February the coup d’e-tat had been nipped in the bud. The mastermind behind the intended upraising was a mysterious individual under the cover name of “White Elephant”. It has been assumed that this person was Alfonso Armada, who had previously been Juan Carlo’s tutor at Zaragoza Military Academy. Antonio Tejero eventually realised that he had been turned into a scapegoat and doggedly held out until mid-day on 24th February before releasing his hostages. There are many theories surrounding “23F” but it has in general been realised that the support and planning of the upraising was wider and deeper than first imagined. Much of the evidence has been swept under the carpet. The gang of three, Armada, Milans del Bosch and Tejero received stiff prison sentences. Armada’s position was precarious due to his closeness to the King. He claimed during his trial that Juan Carlos had been aware of the plot and given it his unofficial blessing. Nothing could be proved to that extent and the King emerged out of the episode as the undisputed hero. Without doubt it was due to Juan Carlos’ firm stand during the tense hours of “23F” that the democratisation process did not splinter into a thousand pieces. “23F” had a profound impact on the Transition putting the final stamp of “No return” on the proceedings. Mass demonstrations in support of the “New Spain” followed making any further subversion something of the past. Consolidation. Finally soon afterwards in February 1981 Calvo Sotelo was sworn in as Prime Minister against the sombre background of the coup d’e tat although his premiership was destined to be that of a caretaker. UCD continued to disintegrate with an exodus of its delegates leaving the sinking ship to seek refuge and fortune in other parties. The most prominent beneficiary from the UCD demise was Manuel Fraga’s Alianza Popular which had gradually emerged as the principal representative of the centre-right political block. New elections were held on 28 October 1982. The outright winner with a large parliamentary majority both in the Congress and the Senate was PSOE with Alianza Popular in second place, thus becoming the official opposition. This saw the dawn of a new chapter in the history of Spain with the Transition moving into the more stable phase of Consolidation, a continuous process up to present time. Copyright - Bjorn E. Engstrom
|